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Abstract
This paper studies how investors react to public messages that may be
optimistically biased. We first construct a communication game between an
investor and a (possibly) biased securities analyst. We find an equilibrium
characterised by the following properties: first, the investor reacts more to bad
news than to good news, and second, the diﬀerence in this reaction is higher
when the investor has a greater prior suspicion that the analyst is a biased
type. We then use nonparametric techniques and a large database of earnings
forecasts to test these predictions, and find that the evidence supports them.
Lastly, we use our empirical strategy to discriminate between the causes for
analysts’ bias.
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Star analyst Henry Blodget ”described the shares of excite@home, which he publicly
rated as a short-term accumulate and long-term buy, as “such a piece of crap”. Of
InfoSpace, both a short- and a long-term buy, he claimed in private emails that the
“stock is a powder keg”” The Economist [39].
1 Introduction
Securities analysts are often accused of trying to propagate enthusiasm about the
companies they cover, irrespective of their personal opinions. The media regularly
carries stories illustrating analysts’ distorted incentives and how they lead to their
unwarranted optimism. Regulators have also shown their concern through Regulation
Fair Disclosure and other recent reforms aimed at reinforcing the separation between
the research and corporate departments of big sell-side houses. At the core of these
new regulations is the presumption that small investors need to be protected from un-
scrupulous analysts. On the other hand, big sophisticated investors -who account for
the great majority of volume traded1- are believed to be aware of analysts’ potential
conflicts of interest2. Eﬀorts to protect small investors are undoubtedly praisewor-
thy. However, it is also important to consider the wider question of how investors as
a whole react to analysts’ public advice, when pondering analysts’ influence on the
financial markets.
Unfortunately the academic literature on analysts’ earnings forecasts has largely
avoided this question. The optimistic bias in analysts’ forecasts has been the focus
of a considerable body of work3, mostly studying its causes and evolution in time.
However, the possibility that investors may not take these forecasts at face value
has been consistently overlooked in these studies. This has clearly hindered our
understanding of how information is transmitted and interpreted in the financial
markets when the incentives of the parties involved diverge.
This paper fills this gap by explicitly studying the interaction between a rational
investor and an analyst who may be optimistically biased. We show theoretically
that uncertainty about the incentives of the analyst makes the investor assign diﬀerent
levels of credibility to diﬀerent messages. This has two intuitive testable consequences:
the investor reacts more to bad news than to good news, and this diﬀerence is larger
when she has a higher prior suspicion that the analyst is a biased type. We then
use nonparametric techniques to show that the stock market’s reaction to analysts’
1For instance, the NYSE Research Department computed that in May 2000, institutional in-
vestors accounted for 64 percent of all order flow, broker-dealers for 27 percent, individual investors
for 4 percent, floor-entered orders for 3 percent and the remaining 2 percent were unidentified
(Badrinath and Wahal [6]) .
2See Boni and Womack [10], for survey-based evidence of this.
3See, for instance, Abarbanell and Lehavy [1], Brown [11], Chen and Jiang [12], Dechow, Hutton
and Sloan [15], Gu and Wu [23], Lim [29], Lin and McNichols [30], McNichols and O’Brien [31], and
Michaely and Womack [32].
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earnings forecasts is consistent with these predictions.
Our model is related to the literature of ”cheap talk” started by Crawford and
Sobel [14]. Although this theoretical literature has become increasingly popular in
the last two decades, it has not been followed by a similar surge in studies testing its
empirical implications. As a result very little is known about its predictive power.
One of our major contributions is to combine a theoretical and empirical analysis in
the field of strategic information transmission within a continuous space.
Model and Theoretical Results
In our model the investor is uncertain about the type of the analyst, whereas the
analyst observes both his own type and the earnings that he expects the company to
make. He then issues a forecast (i.e. a ”message”) that the investor must interpret and
react to. The analyst may be either ”honest”, in which case he will truthfully report
his information, or ”biased”, in which case he will strategically raise his message in
order to induce the investor into believing that the situation is better than he knows it
to be. The driving force of the model is the fact that the investor can use the forecast
to update the likelihood that the analyst is biased rather than honest. Optimistic
forecasts are assigned a lower probability of mirroring the true information (i.e. they
are not ”credible”) and are strongly discounted.
We study equilibria where the action of the investor depends continuously on the
analyst’s message. In the most informative of such equilibria, the action function is
strictly increasing and concave if the message is not too optimistic, and flat if the
message exceeds a certain value. Using comparative statics we find that the slope
of the action function is lower if the investor has a higher prior suspicion that the
analyst is biased.
The strict concavity of the reaction function is caused by the interaction between
the optimal strategies of both agents. Intuitively, because the analyst anticipates
that optimistic forecasts are given less credibility, the more favourable his private
information about the company is, the more he exaggerates. By doing this he only
strengthens the investor’s presumption that she should heavily discount optimistic
forecasts. In equilibrium the forecast of a biased analyst increases with his private
information in a convex way, and its converse (i.e. the reaction of the investor)
increases with the forecast only in a concave way. A similar intuition is behind the
lower reaction to forecasts by highly suspected analysts.
Empirical findings
We test these predictions using a large database of company earnings, analysts
forecasts and the stock market’s reaction to them. We first find that analysts are
indeed biased, especially when they announce good news. For instance, when an
average analyst announces an optimistic forecast of 10 cents above the consensus,
actual earnings are, on average, only 2 cents higher. However if the analyst announces
bad news of 10 cents below the consensus, actual earnings are lower, on average, by
13 cents. Using nonparametric techniques we find that the function relating expected
earnings and forecasts is indeed concave, as predicted by our model.
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We show next that investors react more to pessimistic forecasts than to optimistic
ones. When an analyst announces good news of 10 cents, the price on the shares of
this company increases, on average, by 0.15% on the day on which the announcement
was made. However, if he reports a bad news of 10 cents the price decreases by 0.7%,
more than 5 times higher in magnitude. In our sample the standard deviation of the
daily return is 3.6%, so 0.7% is an economically significant magnitude. We plot a
nonparametric regression of the stock market reaction to analysts forecasts and find
again a concave curve.
We then study the eﬀect on investors’ reaction of their prior suspicion that the
analyst is biased. We conjecture that if an analyst has predicted above actual earnings
in most of his forecasts in the past, investors will consider him very likely to be
optimistically biased. We indeed find that when such analysts announce an optimistic
forecast of 10 cents, the share price does not increase. However if the same forecast is
announced by an analyst who has not issued too optimistic forecasts in the past, the
share price reacts by a magnitude of 0.27%. Again, this is economically significant.
Lastly, we discriminate amongst possible causes for analysts’ bias. Our evidence
is preliminary, but suggestive. We find the bias to be higher if the analyst is working
for a smaller brokerage house and the company covered is bigger and followed by
more analysts. We conjecture that the misalignment of incentives may be related to
the ”bargaining power” of the analyst versus the managers of the company studied.
Outline
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses related work.
Section 3 outlines the model, and Section 4 derives the theoretical results, which are
restated in the form of empirical predictions in Section 5. The data is presented in
Section 6 and our main empirical results in Section 7. Section 8 discriminates among
alternative causes for analysts’ misaligned incentives. Section 9 briefly concludes. All
the figures, tables and proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Related work
The theoretical contribution closest to ours is Morgan and Stocken [33]. These authors
propose a continuous model with two types of strategic senders who diﬀer on whether
or not their preferences are aligned with those of the receiver’s. They restrict their
attention to a scenario where the state space is bounded. One of their equilibria allows
the advisor with aligned preferences to credibly transmit his private information, if
it is unfavourable enough. However, his information cannot be transmitted if it
exceeds the sum of the lowest possible state value and the bias of the misaligned
advisor. The reason is that the unbiased advisor can only convey information in the
range of messages that he would never use if he was positively biased. The range
of values where Morgan and Stocken’s equilibrium applies is very limited in most
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real-life examples and strictly zero in an unbounded state space scenario4.
Ottaviani and Squintani [36] were the first to introduce a non-strategic agent in
a Crawford and Sobel framework. They focus on the case of a non-strategic receiver
and find an equilibrium where the action function is continuous in the message. They
also find that this equilibrium is characterised by an ex ante biased action and by no
loss of information due to strategic reasons. In this paper we complement their work
by studying the case of a sender who may be non-strategic with some probability.
Contrary to them, however, we find that some information is lost in equilibrium.
Furthermore, our interest is in characterising the most eﬃcient equilibrium, whereas
Ottaviani and Squintani only show its existence.
The issue of credibility and cheap talk was previously studied by Sobel [38] and
Benabou and Laroque [7]. However their binary-state repeated models are less related
to our work.
On the empirical side the paper most related to ours is Michaely and Womack
[32]. They study the stocks that, following an IPO, were positively recommended
by underwriter and non-underwriter analysts. They show that the former perform
poorly in comparison to the latter, and interpret this as evidence that underwriter
analysts are positively biased in their stock recommendations. Furthermore, they find
some weak evidence that the market may be aware of this bias, and therefore reacts
less to a ”buy” recommendation if issued by an underwriter analyst5. We improve
on Michaely and Womack on several grounds. By focusing on earnings forecasts (a
continuous variable) rather than on stock recommendations (a discrete variable), we
are able to study the curvature of the stock’s market reaction, and provide much
sharper evidence of the way in which the market discounts the bias. Furthermore,
the use of a theoretical model allows us to enrich the set of testable predictions and
to consider an alternative hypothesis. Lastly, our predicted variable is not aﬀected
by the recommendation of the analyst, and therefore our test, unlike Michaely and
Womack’s, does not suﬀer from endogeneity problems.
3 Credibility in a cheap talk model
An investor (she) is interested in acquiring shares of a certain company if that is
profitable. Among the various variables that aﬀect such profitability, the investor
pays attention to its future earnings. At a given moment in time, the market holds
an underlying consensus, c, about those future earnings and such consensus is in-
corporated in the price of the shares. The investor responds to news related to the
company, buying when the news is favourable in relation to the consensus and selling
otherwise.
4Clearly this is the realistic scenario in our application of earnings per share. It is also realistic
in Morgan and Stocken’s example, whose focus is the future share price of the company.
5The diﬀerence between the reactions to the two types of analysts is only significant at the 10%
level.
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Information Structure
Although the investor is interested in learning more about the company, she has
no independent means of obtaining such information, either due to limited attention
(there may be many alternative investment opportunities to consider) or lack of the
expertise required to understand its accounts or strategy. A securities analyst (he) has
this information. He uses it, in conjunction with c, to compute an optimal (private)
guess, g, about future earnings. Define x = g−c as the news above or below consensus
arising from the private information of the analyst. We assume that x is distributed
normally with zero mean, x ∼ N(0,σ2).
Preferences
The investor’s gain from learning x arises from the opportunity to rebalance her
investment portfolio due to the new information. Define a as the action of buying
or selling shares, where strictly positive (negative) values of a account for buying
(selling) shares, and a = 0 accounts for doing nothing. With each piece of news and
action is associated a benefit, U I = U I(a, x). We simplify the portfolio decision by
assuming that the utility of the investor reaches a unique maximum for aI = x and
is:
U I(a, x) = −(a− x)2
This function can be interpreted as the utility loss suﬀered by the investor when
she fails to adjust her portfolio eﬃciently in the light of new existing information.
The central conflict of the model arises because the preferences of the investor
and the analyst may not be perfectly aligned. In particular, we assume that the
analyst may prefer the investor to take a higher action than is optimal for her, aA =
x + b > x = aI , where b > 0 is the degree of dissonance between the preferences of
both agents. Assume that q is the prior probability that the analyst is biased. There
are diﬀerent ways of deriving such conflict of interest from the preferences of the
analyst. We follow Morgan and Stocken [33] and assume that the objective function
of the biased analyst consists of two elements: a benefit associated with inflating the
investor’s action and a cost associated with poor performance caused by the distortion
of the information revealed to the investor.
UA(a, x, b) = 2ba− (a− x)2
We also allow for the possibility of the analyst being honest and non-strategic
and therefore reporting his information truthfully. This assumption is also used by
Ottaviani and Squintani [36] and by Benabou and Laroque [7]. The justifications for
this assumption can be behavioural (an analyst adhering to a code of ethics by which
distorting information is considered immoral) or in terms of payoﬀ uncertainty. In
reality, an analyst who misrepresents his private information runs some risk of being
discovered and fined huge penalties. For instance, when the above mentioned Henry
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Blodget, was discovered to hold diﬀerent views in his private e-mails from the ones
that he maintained in public , he was fined $4m and barred from the securities
industry for life6. Our assumption of non-strategic honesty could therefore apply to
analysts who are very risk averse or who estimate the chances of being caught lying
as very high. We believe, however, that allowing for a strategic analyst with aligned
incentives who cared about being perceived as not biased would not qualitatively
alter our theoretical results.
Information Transmission and Contracts
In line with the cheap talk literature, we adopt the view that an investor has no
means of inducing truthful revelation through a contract. The analyst can, however,
issue a message m to influence the investor’s belief over his privately observed x.
The message takes the form of a forecast f , where m = f − c. An honest analyst
always truthfully announces m = x. A biased analyst, by contrast, follows a message
strategy, consisting of a family of functions (υ (m | x))x∈<, where υ (m | x) is a p.d.f.
of m given x. If the analyst follows a pure strategy over some range of the state
space, [x1, x2], then υ (m | x) is degenerate in this range and can be represented by
the function µ : x→ m.
Timing
The timing is as follows: (i) The analyst learns his type, honest or biased (ii) The
analyst learns x and issues a message m (iii) The investor observes m and adopts an
action a (iv) The payoﬀs of both agents are realised.
Equilibrium concept
We study Perfect Bayesian Equlibria (PBE), where investor’s beliefs are formed
using Bayes’ rule and, given those beliefs, the biased analyst maximises his payoﬀ.
4 Analysis
In the model outlined in Section 3, there is a misalignment of incentives that may
create obstacles to the transmission of information. It is therefore important to know
whether, under the diﬀerent equilibria of this model, an analyst of a particular type
can successfully induce higher actions when he observes a higher state of the world.
Define Aji (x) as the action that occurs under a particular equilibrium of the model, j,
when an analyst of type i observes a state of the world x. Define aj(m) as the action
that occurs under equilibrium j when a message m is issued.
We restrict our attention to equilibria where Aji (x) is a continuous function (i.e.
the action does not ”jump around” when the state of the world is slightly higher or
lower). We then focus our analysis on the responsiveness of the action to the state of
the world under the diﬀerent equilibria.
6In a similar scandal, another analyst employed by Citigroup was fined $15m and also barred
from the industry.
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Definition 1 We define a continuous equilibrium as an equilibrium where the func-
tion Aji (x) is continuous. Consider two continuous equilibrium functions, A
J
i (x) and
AKi (x), and assume that they are strictly increasing in the sets of state values X
J
i
⊆ R and XKi ⊆ R respectively.
1. We define equilibrium J as being more responsive than equilibrium K if XKi ⊂
XJi ∀i.
2. We define equilibrium J as the most responsive continuous equilibrium if every
other continuous equilibrium j of the model has a corresponding Xji such that
Xji ⊂ XJi ∀i.
3. We define equilibrium J as being fully-responsive if XJi = R ∀i.
Intuitively, high responsiveness corresponds to a situation when a lot of informa-
tion is being credibly transmitted by the analyst (i.e. the investor is responding to
higher messages by taking higher actions).
Our aim in this section is to characterise the most responsive equilibrium. To do
this, we solve the model by backwards induction and apply our equilibrium concept.
We start by finding the optimal reaction of an investor to a message, and then solve
for the optimal strategy of a biased analyst.
4.1 The investor’s problem
As will be shown below, a biased analyst strategically raises his message above his
private information to induce higher actions by the investor. A rational investor will
therefore be cautious about following the message literally. To the extent that m
is informative about x, however, it should not be discarded. Define υ(m | x) as
the mixed strategy that the investor believes that a biased analyst is following upon
observing x, with
R
υ(m | x)dm = 1, and µ(x) as the equivalent in pure strategies.
Define also φ(.) and Φ(.) as the normal density function and the normal distribution
function respectively. The optimal reaction of the investor can be written as the
solution to the problem:
Max
a
E
£
U I(a, x) | m¤ (1)
Lemma 2 The optimal reaction of an investor to a message m is given by:
a = E[x | m] = (1− q)mφ(m) + q
R∞
−∞ xυ (m | x)φ (x) dx
(1− q)φ(m) + q
R∞
−∞ υ (m | x)φ (x) dx
(2)
If the message is believed to having been issued using a pure strategy, the optimal
reaction is given by:
a = E[x | m] = (1− q)mφ(m) + qµ
−1(m)φ (µ−1(m))
(1− q)φ(m) + qφ (µ−1(m)) (3)
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